# Emory KR Round 5 Wiki Doc

## 1NC

### Topicality---1NC

#### Should requires certainty and immediacy.

Stetler 18

the word "should is to be met now, not at a later time not aspirational, but to do now 'should' is a mandatory term

#### Restrictions must be immediate---the CP is a remote measure.

Supreme Court of India 16

what does restricti mean any limitation must be real and immediate If a law immediately it would be restriction But a law which may have only indirect and remote repercussions cannot be considered to be a restriction

#### They violate---gradual phase outs are bad because they make the topic limitless to starting by phasing out any modernization program and then eventually doing a plank---zeroes all core neg ground.

### First Strike CP---1NC

#### The United States should order the launch of 10 modified Minuteman-III W87 Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles at thermonuclear ignition points on Jupiter and Saturn.

#### The plan eliminates ICBMs, but the CP uses them to nuke Jupiter and Saturn, turning them into suns. That’s key to terraform and colonize Mars and other satellites of Jupiter and Saturn.

Popoviciu 10

heating the Martian atmosphere should release carbon dioxide triggering a runaway greenhouse effect This would bring temperatures closer to those on Earth and create a atmosphere and planetary water cycle. The Bosch reaction might be ideal for Mars The reaction requires high temperatures The only realistic source in quantities are the two gas giants, Saturn and Jupiter Saturn and Jupiter can be ignited, transforming our solar system into a 3-star system and warming the other outer moons, making them habitable the only thing which prevents Saturn and Jupiter from igniting is the lack of an external activating source the solution would require a thermonuclear trigger to ignite them the only possibility would involve the triggering of a thermonuclear reaction these gas giants might be ignited secondary to thermonuclear stellification inside thermonuclear bombs a fission trigger creates temperatures of 35,000,000 K, One obvious possibility is detonation of a several-megaton thermonuclear warhead inside the giant planet a spacecraft could reach a depth of at least 2% and could detonate its nuclear charge The chain reaction propagates in a substantial part of the planet’s mass and becomes self-sustainable delivering light and heat this would be the fastest and most inexpensive way for warming the red planet. In less than one century Mars might have a thick atmosphere earthlike temperatures and a hydrosphere supporting terrestrial microorganisms What about the charge a probe could carry ten W87 warheads stellification would not only allow mankind to terraform and colonize satellites but Mars runaway greenhouse effect that could lead to ecopoiesis the first step required for terraforming the planet. such thing could be achieved using thermonuclear detonations The costs are small compared to such a great potential.

#### Space col via terraforming is key to avert inevitable extinction from thousands of potential existential risks.

Ćirković 19

there are literally thousands of probable catastrophic scenarios there is a non-vanishing [probability](https://www.sciencedirect.com/topics/social-sciences/probability) that Earth is on the collision course with an old neutron star or a black hole colonization is the only way of mitigating such cataclysmic collision necessity of comparing small probabilities has been recognized in risk analysis a large asteroid colliding with Earth causing human extinction we can survive on Earth only a minuscule fraction of its remaining habitable time, due to natural cataclysms if we do not develop space tech the terrestrial [biosphere](https://www.sciencedirect.com/topics/social-sciences/biosphere) is a single system and uniqueness is always more fragile than multiplicity humans will one day colonize and terraform Mars

### Politics---1NC

#### Child tax credit extension passes now, but Biden’s PC is key.

Phillips 1-19

The White House urging Congress to pass a bipartisan tax bill expand the child tax credit teeing up for a full House vote that at the end of the month. House advanced a bipartisan bill the President will continue the fight restore the Child Tax Credit the bipartisan bill is a welcome step forward, and Congress should pass it in an election year the deal could offer wins that both parties could take home to voters.

#### Nuclear posture changes tank Biden’s PC.

Collina 21

Biden review American nuclear policy efforts indicate Biden wants arms control Biden’s success will depend on how much p c he can spend bomb is deeply embedded Changing takes leadership focused, sustained attention over years

#### CTC reverses the aging crisis.

Bindner 19

largest problem aging population only solution is a decent income through tax benefits an explicit subsidy for family size overcomes this market failure, leading to a reverse of the aging crisis a child tax credit take away the disincentive to have kids more workers attain levels of productivity large enough to reverse the demographic time bomb

#### Extinction.

Vladev 20

demographic s a factor for existence of civilization are wide and create hazards for society leading the problems of our time influence peace international security health and education resources for societies Decreasing due to aging and shortage of labour cause social problems demographic bombs affect water, food, energy, raw materials as well as environment and climate resolving problem s of future gen s

### President CP---1NC

#### The Republican presidential candidate for the 2024 United States general election should publicly announce that the United States phasing out intercontinental ballistic missiles, halting replacements for the LGM-30 is a top campaign priority.

#### Nuclear reductions are a massive campaign liability because they cede the “weak on defense” narrative.

Cirincione 22

review is expected to endorse nuclear weapons weapons include a new i c b m Biden not expected to declare that the U S will never first use Biden would have had to confront an entrenched nuclear bureaucracy Biden’s failure to challenge the status quo is not unique nuclear policy is driven by domestic factors ncluding lobbying by the defense industry those who see nuclear superiority as necessary they see reductions as weakness and agreements with adversaries as concessions Being “weak on defense has been a fear for decades cut nuc s is a liability for campaigns

#### That’s good---Trump presidency locks in catastrophic warming.

Dembicki 20

Trump would destroy best-case outcome and send us hurtling towards a worst-case scenario human life could be irreversibly transformed We would likely surpass 2 degrees raising the odds of catastrophic tipping points his policies could cause 3.1 gigatons by 2035 countries drop out of Paris causing it to unravel

#### Warming outweighs other risks by a trillion times.

Ng ’19

climate causing extinction is due to non‐linearity, cascading feedbacks, multiplicative thresholds and tipping points ice collapse cause sea level rise’ the replacement of an ice sea by a liquid ocean surface from melting reduces the reflection and increases the of sunlight, leading to warming; the drying of from warming increases forest fires and the release of carbon; and higher ocean temperatures may lead to the release of methane trapped under the ocean floor, producing runaway global warming. the adaptability limit to mak extinction likely and moderate models unreliabl Even if there is 1 per cent probability Extinction is more important by a trillion

### MQD CP---1NC

#### The Department of Defense should publish an agency memorandum stating that it has the authority to phase out intercontinental ballistic missiles, halting replacements for the LGM-30 Minuteman.

#### The United States Congress should challenge that memorandum on the grounds that it did not grant the agency express authorization over phasing out intercontinental ballistic missiles, halting replacements for the LGM-30 Minuteman. The Supreme Court of the United States should rule in favor of the agency.

#### The counterplan overturns the major questions doctrine (MQD)---that’s key to effective financial warfare.

Meyer & Sitaraman 23

rise of m q d to delegate to the executive to resolve question central to statutory scheme Congress threatens to unmake executive’s authority over foreign affairs executive power levy sanctions engage in warfare based on delegations from Congress MQD threatens ability to fight conflicts conquest terrorism prolif met with economic measures statutes running afoul MQD If MQD is applied judges second-guessing executive judges lack knowledge contravenes legal system

#### Extinction via a litany of hotspots.

Fishman 17

era of economic warfare China threatened sanctions in Taiwan Russia responded with restrictions Saudi imposed penalties states trying to challenge the world order triggering great-power war economic combat inevitable Curtailing sanctions would be akin to those who protested the Industrial Rev by smashing machines: the individual may opt out, but the tool will spread the U S must prepare itself for coming economic battles goal should establish sanctions as the deterrent in the gray zone

### Russia DA---1NC

#### Putin is pushing unpopular subs modernization now to convince his public of an effective Russian second-strike defense---but that’s their only purpose---the plan eliminates its primary driver and opens funding streams that get redirected to other areas of the arsenal.

Seibt 23

It is no coincidence Putin chose to invest in submarines Russia’s heavy investment guarantees against a American nuclear attack what analysts call second-strike The Kremlin is trying to convey maritime power submarines do little to change balance of power in the Pacific submarines will come at the expense of resources allocated to other branches of the military they demonstrate how schizophrenic Moscow can Putin can ill afford to abandon his program Putin has constantly repeated that the West represents a threat and he must now prove to his public he is taking the necessary measures also needs to back up his claim to uphold Moscow’s standing among powers

#### Specifically, subs modernization has been prioritized over two other systems---Rubezh and Barguzin---because it is a status symbol. The plan’s status accession pours funding back into these projects.

Warren 23

nuclear weapons are status symbols These systems highlight the sophistication of Russian industry and bestow prestige These weapons consistent with the domestic political goals of Putin states may emulat to enhance status Putin prioritized novel nuc s Russia has prioritized these at the expense of two other systems Rubezh and Baraguzin status implications are a common motif modernization across the nuclear triad has been tied to status in multiple speeches

#### Reviving the “Ghost Train” Barguzin opens up terror vulnerabilities.

Roblin 20

Moscow Institute developing a successor called the Barguzin The new Ghost Train could mount six ballistic missiles and can perform evasive maneuvers to evade b m i in reality the bottom fallen out of the program’s funding as economy contracted the missile train had been left out of the ten-year plan to free up funding for critical programs the Barguzin project could be revived should circumstances change There are big problems starting with exposure to terrorist attacks Rails not difficult to destroy trains difficult to track

#### Terrorism is the most probable scenario for nuclear war.

Rohlfing 22

a nuclear terrorist event could be a catalyst for a much larger nuclear exchange think about the leaders of nuclear weapons states we have to worry about rush action the biggest risk of a catastrophic nuclear event will come from miscalc or a misperceived use.

### Advantage CP---1NC

#### The United States should fully fund the ICBMs leg of the arsenal without taking funds from other defense items and fully fund the air leg of the arsenal.

### Arms Control---1NC

#### ICBM reductions won’t assure Russia until missile defense is addressed.

Charap et al 22

MIRVing functions as a countermeasure to missile defence some suggest Russia might agree to reduce its ICBM bilateral reductions are unlikely to go far as long as Russia’s strategic stability concerns related to US missile defences remain unaddressed

#### No credibility. Single triad changes are not credible and are useless for crisis stability.

Horovitz et. al 21

benefits of SP only achieved if U S fundamentally changed structure of its forces Moscow and Beijing voiced their doubts of a US SP declaratory policy. US adversaries see nuc weapons only as means for dealing with nuc aggression Washington have to significantly scale back weapons in other situations. Just eliminating individual categories for example ICBMs), would be insufficient fear would continue to be buttressed by sub and conventional precision strike adversaries prepare for this worst-case scenario rather than trust words alone to convince adversaries Washington would have to relinquish key strategic capabilities nuclear and non-nuclear alike and ultimately US military’s global preeminence

#### No risk of arms control. Russia will pocket the concession, and aren’t swayed by public pressure.

Costlow 18

If the U S were to unilaterally eliminate its ICBMs One option is Russia eliminat all their ICBMs This seems least likely a much larger portion of its arsenal would be cut compared to the U.S Russia places multiple warheads on its ICBMs it seems unlikely that Russia would engage in the reciprocal elimination of ICBMs more likely option would be pocketing the concession and claiming to begin discussions negotiations would likely go nowhere both Russia and China would want to secure the advantage Putin does not appear to be swayed by pressure Putin appears to believe that defense spending on nuclear forces will drive economic prosperity cutting defense would be equal to cutting growth strategic deterrent remains a top priority for which Russia will spare no effort

#### AFF doesn’t solve---their evidence about “ending” the GBSD says it should be paused.

#### Arms control fails---Russia and China say no, and no enforcement.

Williams & Adamopoulos 22

Russia’s invasion poisoned prospects for dialogue on reducing nuc s activities already proven damaging to arms control and disarm efforts arms control has been under strain the war highlighted its limits in preventing aggression and escalation the war demonstrated limits focused on avoiding inadvertent escalation Russia’s invasion was not an accident Russian and Chinese strategies involve manipulation of risk underpinned by a reliance on nuclear coercion They do not want to reduce risks Russia has consistently violated arms control obligations Moscow has drawn down participation in activities, decreased transparency, and backstopped actions with nuclear threats nuc s are of increasing strategic value to autocrats Putin relied on nuc s throughout Ukraine tensions with China may be a harbinger of challenges in deterring two competitors Future arms control will have to address multiple domains Traditional tools may struggle arms control with only one could create opportunity for the other to pursue strategic superiority

#### Unilateral action fails. Arms races are inevitable---only keeping up pressure brings adversaries to the table---the aff moves in the wrong direction.

Khatiri 23

Nukes are attractive because They provide guarantee against invasion Reagan managed to enact the first-ever treaty that reduced the number of nukes between the U.S. and the Soviet Union They did it by, first, building more Arms control and reduction are noble goals, but only if they are not unilateral Americans must not lose sight but it is possible to convince enemies to stop only if the U S increases threat and cost of prolif by outpacing them and make missiles obsolete When we build, they build When we stop, they build

#### No Russia impact.

Rogan 22.

the intent Putin's threat is to dangle escalation to deter Western unity This would not be the first time Putin needs the West to hesitate before punishing him a nuclear strike would not be in Russia's interest The Kremlin appears shocked by Western sanctions imposed upon its economy were Russia to detonate a nuclear warhead it would precipitate total economic isolation precipitating mass protests and encouraging a palace coup it is far from certain Russian military forces would carry out a nuclear attack personnel know nuclear strike would entail catastrophic sanctions and degradation of Russian military honor The Russians know this dynamic would exacerbate risk

### Procurement---1NC

#### The advantage is a double turn with the first. It says that Russia is looking for a window of opportunity to expand. The first advantage says that Russia responds to the plan with reciprocal draw downs.

#### Cutting the ICBM force results in negligible savings, and massive short-term costs.

Kroenig et al., 21

land leg is the cheapest leg cutting the ICBM by a quarter would not result in a 25 percent discount annual savings from ICBM cuts would come to less than one percent any cost savings depend on how planners decide to allocate the ICBM reductions There are currently fifty empty silos Because adversaries do not know which silos are empty, enemy counterforce would need to expend two nuclear warheads per silo on the fifty empty silos . Missile silos cannot be left empty and un-crewed for long enable adversaries to determine which silos were empty. operating costs would not be reduced Shutting down an entire missile wing, result in short-term costs costs include removing the missiles, transporting warheads, demolishing structures, and environmental cleanup

#### Doesn’t solve deterrence---funding won’t be properly redirected if fights are true!

#### No risk of accidents.

Quackenbush 23

There is a divide between accidental war in models and lit central is that something inadvertent results in war purely by chance, without choice No war occurred in this manner, so no cases correspond in stark contrast to discussions This adds the leader’s choice no war is accidental mistaken warning seems to be about incomplete info The only way for monitoring to affect likelihood is making info complete Info can affect the likelihood leaders choose war, but will not affect war from chance Incomplete info is already accounted for both logic and evidence contradict accidental war scholars want to believe the military can cause war

#### ICBMs are affordable and the least expensive leg.

Kroenig 18

nuclear mod will make up 5 to 7 percent of the defense budget This is much smaller than historic levels of spending ICBMs are the least costly leg Placing a nuc in a fixed silo is much cheaper building a new stealth bomber annual operating costs are estimated at $1.4 billion If cost savings are a top priority then ICBM should not be on the chop- ping block

#### No catastrophic cyberattacks---25 years of empirics prove they stay low-level and non-escalatory.

Lewis 20

catastrophic cyberattack remains imaginary . catastrophe must produce mass casualties . cyber catastrophe requires technical skills actors do not possess. There is uncertainty among potential attackers about U S ability to attribute that they are unwilling to risk retaliation . ( Their emphasis is espionage and coercion. U S opponents have no interest in a catastrophic attack since it would produce catastrophic retal . inadvertent escalation has never occurred. suggests high control by advanced states. Attackers seek to avoid escalation. scenarios discount robustness of modern econ given attention to cybersecurity and people quickly rebuild. after 25 years without Why raised so often? the first reports hoped to scare people into action. The shadow of nuclear annihilation still shapes thinking to expect extreme outcomes. also by 9/11 .

#### No China or Russia threat impact.

## 2NC

### Russia DA---2NC

#### Extinction.

Bartoux 22

nuclear arsenals remain alive and well M A D does not take into account the possibility of accidental and unauthorized nuclear explosions of nuclear terrorism setting off a chain of catastrophes from which there will be no return.

#### 1. Tight budgets forced tough prioritizations that left out Barguzin, but domestic politics is the tiebreaker---the plan flips that.

Warren 23

budget cuts prevented the development of every system forcing the prioritization of particular systems Russian government made the decision to prioritize Sarmat Avangard over Barguzin and Rubezh Barguzin and Rubezh had their funding withdrawn prioritization was driven by domestic politics the interest of Putin could serve as status symbols

#### 2. Putin is beholden to the military. They prioritize land-based capabilities like Barguzin over all others.

Warren 23

Russian military influences weapons procurement Among determinants are the historical experiences past prioritization of land-based capabilities over air or sea sea-based nuclear weapons have never played the same role as land-based nuclear weapons in Russian doctrine

#### 3. Fiscal constrains were the only obstacle---designers are ready to go and revival could carry future nukes.

Warren 23

Barguzin to create a rail-mobile ICBM Fiscal constraints prevented development MITT general designer was ready and able should the government decide to resume the program Barguzin could be revived especially since it could carry future nuc s Barguzin would be a potential carrier for Kedr.

#### 4. Inter-service rivalries lock in the shift.

Warren 23

Inter-service rivalry played a role in procurement S R F were the first nuclear-armed branch and have built significant influence over nuclear procurement This has reinforced preference for land-based nuclear weapons leading to greater marginalization of sea and air

#### Rubezh deployment collapses NATO unity and locks in arms racing.

Fedorov 15

the “Rubezh an essential threat to European security American countermeasures fall into three categories active defenses counterforce capabilities strike capabilities ground-launched cruise missiles would be one op- tion to explore Moscow will deploy its new Rubezh and aim them at Europe This will strengthen Moscow’s ability to blackmail and threaten European states to undermine the unity of the Atlantic alliance defeat troops Moscow wants to put NATO in a grim position they could either defend Baltic States or refrain undermining the raison d’être

#### NATO collapse greenlights prolif and global war.

Axe 18

Europe toss aside N P T and acquire in order to deter Russia treaty's disintegration lead to countries all over the world pursuing nukes loss of NATO prompt Germany and other non-nuclear to build arsenals European nuclear capabilities encourages instability resulting mistrust tempt Putin to launch nuclear strike in a war in Europe

#### Putin’s spinning subs as a win against a hostile US, but the plan intensifies domestic anti-sub voices.

Kroenig et. al. 20

Kremlin’s foreign policy decisions have some effect on the Russian populace By building exotic nuclear capabilities Putin may portray himself as a strong leader confronting a hostile U S to increase his popularity After all, Putin’s at its lowest point Putin must be careful not to wast resources on nuclear overkill capabilities Already the media have criticized sub and such criticism could increase

#### That matters. Counterforce fears catalyze domestic audiences to prioritize certain nuclear systems---the plan leads to cancellation that frees up resources.

Warren 23

The interests of leaders military, and the defense-industrial complex contribute to the prioritization of specific nuclear systems These actors advocate for systems they believe will achieve their goals this includes international status domestic actors influence mod counterforce capabilities are interpreted as a threat leaders believe that modernizing is necessary for this response constraints at the domestic level limit which programs can be developed They force the government to prioritize leading to the cancellation of other programs

#### It’s particularly true of current Borei class SSBNs that Putin is showing off.

Warren 23

strategic and domestic mechanisms combine to drive mod of SSBN and SLBM Security factors are the main drivers SSBNs are the most important for guaranteeing second strike . Borei and Borei-A provide improved counterforce evasion capabilities perceived as critical for survivable second-strike The prioritization of these systems while others have been delayed or canceled, is the result of sea-based forces for deterrence

#### Specifically, that trades off with systems like Barguzin.

Warren 23

Russia’s development of novel nuclear weapons maintain the effectiveness of nuclear deterrence in the face of counterforce capabilitie Russia’s development is intended to hedge against a future threat posed by the U S rather than to overcome existing U.S. capabilities domestic factors played a role in the prioritization of novel nuclear capabilities at the expense of Barguzin and Rubezh

#### First use cuts back against Russia’s SOI---the plan’s removal accedes to the Putin’s desired regional balance of power.

Bowen 22

Ukraine revealed Putin’s ambitions to reconstitute Russian empire to be secure, Russia needs to revise balance of power consistent with illiberal philosophy and desire to develop Russian s o i the American nuclear deterrent form backbone of European security U S and NATO threatens use earlier in conflict

#### Status the sole geopolitical motivation behind doubling down on subs.

Kroenig et. al. 20

Kremlin using new systems as geopolitical posturing the most important motivation The possession of advanced nuclear arsenal ensure Russia has a seat at the table This is bolstered by timing weeks after the NPR public announcement was solely motivated to counter the NPR Russia may have doubled down

#### Third, HISTORY proves the link. Previous examples of improving security contexts proves that Russia puts SSBN mod on the chopping block.

Warren 23

The design of Borei began during an era of decreasing tension Perceptions of improving security context for Russia created permissive conditions for minimizing sea-based strategic forces Russia experienced eteriorating relations leaders perceived the U S were increasingly willing to use force deterioration reinvigorated efforts to revitalize Russian SSBN force

#### Impact defense doesn’t assume the groups, motives, capabilities, and vulnerabilities in Russia as unlike any else.

Saradzhyan 22

ethnic ultranationalists including Ingush Ossetian Chechen Tatar . Salafi-jihadists separatists acquired radioactive materials threatened to attack nuclear facilities plotted to hijack a sub scouted facilities and established contacts with an insider Doomsday cults Aum had more followers in Russia Aum actively recruited scientists and tech experts to develop w m d even among employees of the Kurchatov Institute

### Advantage 1---2NC

#### BMD deployments heighten fears of decapitating first strikes.

Warren 23

strategists have cited missile defense as a threat BMD deployed in the Arctic perceived as a significant threat to Russia's arsenal strategists also perceive THAAD and Aegis as a threat In combination leaders worry the U S may launch a counterforce strike Putin has cited missile defense as a threat plans to deploy missile defense cannot help but disturb us defensive in name only In fact missile defense] is a strategic offensive capabilities

#### AND conventional capabilities.

Warren 23

counterforce strike could include conventional weapons PGS) capability could significantly strengthen counterforce The United States is developing conventional hypersonic weapons Putin stated that Russia would not allow this and would respond including by developing new nuclear weapons Putin claims that P G S threaten stability, jeopardize arms control experts fear PGS program to attack Russia when combined with BMD PGS will make it possible to launch a disarming first strike

#### 2. Cooperative security measures are politically impossible for both sides.

Perkovich 22.

it is extremely difficult to see a path forward for cooperative security measures In the U.S. it is easier and more profitable politically to pursue short-term policy goals almost all Republican senators would reject any treaty Russia China North Korea or Iran would agree predilection to withdraw from treaties reinforces the view there is no point negotiating it erodes diplomatic capital there are no checks on his power and no alternative perspectives Xi has a bubble His experts are more risk averse there is no indication he has directed underlings to pursue dialogue Administrations worry they will lose power if policy initiatives are not clear wins for the U S and a loss for the other side

#### They’ve dropped no US Russia war---Sarmat. Both sides want to avoid escalation and Ukraine means Russia can’t risk another war. That’s Rogan AND…

D'Anieri 23.

U.S. and Russian militaries have for decades been careful to avoid directly shooting Russian military strikes must be extremely unlikely. the U.S. would respond in a way that is proportional but not escalatory Uncertainty about escalation explains why U.S. and Russia take care to avoid combat Russians understand they too are vulnerable Russian leaders realize second major conflict is not in their interest Russia cannot retake the offensive in 2023

#### Their impact starts at 0.38%

Rodriguez 19

I get a sense of how probable a nuclear war might be by looking at historical evidence, views of experts and predictions made by forecasters if we aggregate those perspectives the chances of a nuclear war between the US and Russia, are around 0.38%

#### ICBMs aren’t destabilizing.

Deptula 2020

Misconception ICBMs inherently destabilizing Do ICBMs significantly increase risk of accidental launch No neutralizing would require massive and unambiguous nuclear strike overlapping network of multi-domain sensors validate indications of launch levels of scrutiny and confirmation prevent misidentification. ICBM launch only occur after deliberate, disciplined and cooperative actions are undertaken ‘hair-trigger’ alert intentionally attempting to frighten

#### No proliferation now---regimes are as strong as ever after Ukraine.

Miller 22

, Russia shows how difficult it is for nonnuclear states to deter if only Ukraine had nuc Russia wouldn’t attack The lesson seems clear you’ll be better off with the bomb Although the logic is persuasive they overlook complexity predictions were never borne out powerful architecture for preventing spread has been constructed This includes N P T sanctions and threat of force all of which restrain the spread This architecture is still in place and stronger than it has ever been almost every state is a member there are no states currently seeking nuclear weapons Iran there is no evidence it has made the decision to build a bomb

### Advantage 2---2NC

#### Sheer numbers create the promise of catastrophic destruction by an ICBM response which is the foundation of deterring Russia.

Osborn 23

numbers when it comes to Russia’s nuclear arsenal has long been a concern Russia’s ICBM arsenal is growing much larger and being modernized presence of numbers present the risk of a “bolt-out-of-the-blue attack Should an air or sea leg rendered inoperable then the remaining deterrent is to ensure a corresponding massive offensive ICBM response The promise of this kind of catastrophic destruction is the foundation of strategic deterrence Sufficient numbers of ICBMs will be critical for US nuclear deterrence

#### ICBMs survive. Current modernization efforts for ICBMs force is necessary and effective. The plan motivates an attack on U.S. cities and allies.

Kroenig Mass & Trotti 21

U S plans to modernize all three legs including ICBMs current modernization backed by consensus serve deterrence of attack and achievement of objectives if deterrence fails arsenal of ICBMs is critical for deterring nuclear attack attacker faced with fewer ICBM would easier time disarming the U S ICBMs serve critical purpose Eliminating ICBMs free up enemy weapons to target US cities increasing damage to U S and allies Russia to develop [exotic nuclear weapons](https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/issue-brief/russias-exotic-nuclear-weapons-and-implications-for-the-united-states-and-nato/)

#### The plan guarantees a swift adversary first-strike.

Osborn 22

Should the land-leg be dissolved US relying upon sea and air according to Pentagon would leave US extremely vulnerable to bolt-out-of-the-blue” enemy nuclear attack large-scale salvo of nuclear weapons overwhelm defenses only way to stop salvo nuclear response prevent an adversary from thinking any way to “win” Pentagon’s deterrence posture proven effective there has not been great power war

#### Endless safeguards and check the risk of accidental conflict.

Heinrichs 20

“hair trigger alert.” is an erroneous characterization alert postures are highly stable subject to multiple layers of control, ensuring presidential decision-making The U S fields sensors to provide warning satellites to detect plumes and other assets enemy launch would occur within a context of tensions this hypothetical nightmare scenario where we have a believable warning that is a false alarm is highly unlikely

#### 2. An abundance of safeguards and recent upgrades prevent accidental launch.

Klotz & Evans 22

Multiple independent reviews confirmed the procedures required are extensive and reinforced by safeguards alert posture is “highly stable” and “subject to multiple layers of control technical developments have added safeguards including human and technological redundancies designed to improve accuracy and speed of detection Launch on warning is a capability, not a plan enhancements expanded the decisionmaking window allowing for earlier detection GBSD program includes improvements in NC3 systems to strengthen cyber resiliency a principal NC3 challenge

#### Wars are started by choice not accident---their scenarios conflate tactical with strategic miscalculation

Brands 20

war won’t start by accident. There is a argument that states can stumble into a conflict The accidental war thesis was raised accidental collision between ships in the S C S It is hard to identify wars that came about even though no one wanted them It was that powers insisted on aggressive policies they knew risked a localized war The reality is that countries tend to avoid war there is no monumental decision than to initiate a conflict when countries do want to avert showdown, they are willing to tack or retreat, even at cost of embarrassment There were near misses Accidental war seems unlikely today U.S. and Chinese policymakers know a war could very well become If both sides truly seek to avoid one Conflict occur when one party decides that war is preferable to the status quo

#### ICBMs are hardwired and immune to cyber threats BUT even if we’re wrong, any alternative is worse.

Kroenig et al., 21

ICBMs hedge against technological risk main criticism sitting ducks compared to SLBMs—assumes that SSBNs always be undetectable seekers gain advantage in submarine warfare new technology come more vulnerable NC3 for ICBMs mmunication channels hardwired deep underground better protected

#### No catastrophic cyberattacks---25 years of empirics prove they stay low-level and non-escalatory.

Lewis 20

catastrophic cyberattack remains imaginary . catastrophe must produce mass casualties . cyber catastrophe requires technical skills actors do not possess. There is uncertainty among potential attackers about U S ability to attribute that they are unwilling to risk retaliation . ( Their emphasis is espionage and coercion. U S opponents have no interest in a catastrophic attack since it would produce catastrophic retal . inadvertent escalation has never occurred. suggests high control by advanced states. Attackers seek to avoid escalation. scenarios discount robustness of modern econ given attention to cybersecurity and people quickly rebuild. after 25 years without Why raised so often? the first reports hoped to scare people into action. The shadow of nuclear annihilation still shapes thinking to expect extreme outcomes. also by 9/11 .

## 1NR

### Advantage CP---1NR

#### No impact---the debt is sustainable.

Spence and Garrett 21

U.S. debt is not far ahead of other markets not a significant outlier in terms of debt sustainability. America’s position is enhanced by the privileged status of the dollar which creates a significant level of built-in demand U.S. Treasury market enjoys safe-haven status bonds helps support the debt There may be innovations making the debt more manageable. Monetary policy can adapt to changing conditions Fed’s move toward a dynamic that makes the level of debt more tenable. Traditional analysis suggests debt levels are sustainable

### Topicality---1NR

#### Eliminate requires complete removal without the possibility of return.

Kyle 10

the term "elimination eliminate" is subject to one reasonable interp complete elimination the word "eliminate denotes a complete removal such that the word "complete is unnecessary When the evidence demonstrated that the product could only "alleviate" the condition for a period of time the advertisement was found to be false According to Defendants the word "eliminate" has several meanings The Court does not agree.

#### The resolution’s plain usage of “eliminate” means to get rid of.

Jesson 23

well-respected dictionaries agree that the definition of eliminate" is to "get rid of None of these includes a definition that so that the thing has different characteristics If the EQB had intended andatory based solely on change the EQB would have described those concepts But the EQB did not promulgate such a rule Instead, the EQB chose to use a simple well-understood word eliminate

### Stellification CP---1NR

#### Only our impacts are existential.

Martin 82

a major nuclear war could kill directly 450 million people it is far from extinction. there would remain alive nine-tenths of the world's population, most of them unaffected areas would be relatively unscathed scientific evidence provides no basis statements that nuclear war will lead to the death of all should be considered exaggerations

#### Only ICBMs can get the job done---they alone can get to orbital heights.

Amabile 16

ICBMs are important because these systems are free-delivery vehicles to low Earth orbit a free ride to earth's orbit We will eventually use atomic devices in space the United States can easily contribute aging ICBMs As a former officer in the US military who worked with missiles and rockets, NASA successfully tested a "space-worthy" nuclear thermal rocket design We can move all of the initial small pieces of equipment into Earth orbit using ICBMs

#### Our stuff relies on classified data---prefer it.

Turchin 9 The artificial explosion of giant planets ways to initialize thermonuclear reaction relates to nuclear technology and consequently they are classified Accessible data contain errors and cannot serve as a guarantee of impossibility of any physical processes.

#### Mars is the next logical step for the US space program. BUT, there needs to be a breakthrough like the CP to provide enough incentive to undertake a broader mission

Knappenburger 15

exploration is likely to remain similar to that seen presently The form which exploration will take is however not entirely clear ambiguity lies in the future of manned exploration NASA may target Mars as the next logical step Regardless without new incentives to push the boundaries of human exploration the American space program will not likely go far nothing thus far has made going to Mars attractive.

#### The key barrier is technological

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we will investigate the historical reasons public support and opinion played an especially important role the major argument against colonization is not against colonization but against prioritizing over current problems Therefore, we find it unlikely that colonizing will gain significant public support right now but colonization will likely awake stronger opinions as the technology improves thus making colonization a reality